The effect of ethnicity on party politics in Nigeria (1999–present) has been paradoxical. Policies designed to end ethnic outbidding and the ethnicisation of party politics have resulted in higher levels of ethnic violence. Policies pursued by the Nigerian framers to ‘get the party system right’ and engender broad, ethnically diverse parties were also expected to reduce the incentives for elites to encourage ethnic violence. They have not. The Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) succeeds as a multi-ethnic coalition on the basis of informal bargains and accommodations. The practice of ‘zoning’, which distributes the spoils of office according to an ethnic formula, produces incentives for local elites to embark upon ethnic violence or ethnic mobilisation as a way of advancing the interests of their local constituencies. The institutional framework of Nigerian democracy creates incentives for ‘two-faced’ elites – cooperative nationally, but ethnically antagonistic in their home districts.
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Brandon Kendhammer (2010) studied this question.
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