There is now much empirical evidence that economic incentives affect the divorce decision via their impact on the flow of benefits of divorced vs married individuals. However the effect of the individual income tax on divorce has been neglected in this work. The income tax in the US is structured so that tax liability often changes with marriage. Some couples incur a penalty in the form of higher taxes when they marry while others receive a subsidy because their tax burden falls with marriage. In this paper the authors examine the impact of the individual income tax on the likelihood of divorce in the US. Using data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics they estimate a discrete-time hazard model of the probability of divorce from the first marriage to test the hypothesis that the probability of divorce rises with the marriage penalty; they also examine the role of other economic factors in the divorce decision. The authors find that individuals respond to tax incentives in their decision to divorce although these responses are typically small and differ for men and women. (authors)
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Whittington et al. (1997) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 3 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: