The effect of provocation on foreign policy response: A test of the matching hypothesis

Does provocation engender a response in like kind? Research suggests that a matched response is common among rivals and is a preferred strategy in situations which resemble prisoner's dilemma. Yet, there is no empirical evidence for matching outside of rivalry or the use of force. This paper examines the hypothesis that nation‐actors respond to provocation in kind by considering the effect of provocation on foreign policy response for a wide range of conflict behavior and a variety of non‐rival nation‐actors. The thesis is advanced that the unique characteristics of dyadic interaction, specifically threat and involvement, serve to dampen or exaggerate response. Using pooled time series analysis of thirty‐five cases from 1950 to 1975, a test of this hypothesis is made. The results show that high levels of involvement discount threat and promote under reaction while low levels preclude response entirely. Moderate levels both dampen and exaggerate threat perception contingent upon the structure of dyadic interaction. For robustness, eleven illustrative cases are examined to flesh out specific dyadic variation. Finally, for comparison, the U.S.‐Sovict rivalry is also examined and shown to reveal a response pattern which includes a retaliatory memory.