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Game-theoretic analysis reveals battery-swap models increase vehicle prices while dampening demand relative to charging, indicating joint infrastructure succeeds only under balanced cost-sharing.
Against the background of the global low-carbon transformation, battery charging and battery swap (BaaS) have become two mainstream energy replenishment modes for battery electric vehicles (BEVs). Existing studies lack comparative Stackelberg game analysis covering fuel vehicle manufacturers, BEV manufacturers, and independent battery operators under heterogeneous consumer preferences including purchase price sensitivity, mileage cost perception, and vehicle depreciation attention. This study establishes a tripartite game framework covering three industrial scenarios: independent charging operation, third-party exclusive battery-swap R&D, and vehicle battery joint swap station construction. By solving closed-form equilibrium solutions and conducting parameter comparative statics plus numerical surface simulation, this paper systematically identifies how multi-dimensional consumer preferences affect product pricing, market demand, battery service level, and supply chain profit distribution. The results indicate that under the given baseline parameter settings, battery swap mode yields higher vehicle prices but lower market demand relative to charging mode; joint R&D only achieves bilateral profit win–win when consumers attach high importance to driving cost and automakers undertake low cost-sharing ratios. This study expands the theoretical framework of BEV energy replenishment supply chain games and provides quantitative decision references for vehicle and battery enterprises to select optimal operational cooperation paths.
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Tan et al. (2026) studied this question.
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