Thinking About Cases

All moral philosophers appeal to intuitions about particular cases—what we might call “case specific intuitions.” But although the extent to which we rely on intuitions about cases is widely recognized, we don’t yet have anything like an adequate account of our practice. In particular, it is far from clear what, if anything, makes it legitimate for us to give these intuitions the kind of priority we typically give them. This essay explores the analogy to empirical observations—since we use empirical observations in forming and evaluating empirical theories in much the same way that we use moral intuitions in forming and evaluating moral theories. While answering some concerns about the analogy along the way, it emphasizes the importance of combining the various intuitions into an overall coherent account; and notes how on almost any view some sort of error theory is going to be required with regard to at least some of the intuitions. The essay closes by questioning whether a distinction we often seem so ready to make—between intuitions about specific cases and intuitions about more general principles—can be successfully maintained.