Conceptual analysis demonstrates that wronging another person requires joint commitment, suggesting interpersonal wronging cannot occur in a pure state of nature.
Can I wrong someone to whom I stand in no social relation? After specifying the sense of “wronging” I have in mind, I consider agreements, and offer an account of them that explains their providing a context for wronging. This account appeals to a joint commitment of the parties. I go on to review and counter arguments from H. L. A. Hart and Stephen Darwall for the possibility of wronging someone in the state of nature, understood as a situation lacking any pertinent joint commitment. I then emphasize the practical importance of joint commitments enjoining morally sound actions.
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Margaret Gilbert (2026) studied this question.
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