Signaling for success in university research funding applications

Signaling theory explains how organizations convey credible information under conditions of information asymmetry. Yet, while recent work highlights that signals often interact—reinforcing or substituting—most studies have treated signals as independent and additive, and empirical evidence of configurational interaction patterns remains limited. This study addresses this limitation by examining how multiple institutional signals jointly shape evaluators’ judgments in peer-reviewed university research funding. Using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), we identify distinct configurations of capability, reputation, and status signals that lead to both high and low funding success. The findings reveal that no single signal ensures success; rather, outcomes emerge from specific portfolios of signals whose effects depend on their combinations. We extend signaling theory by demonstrating that signals can also suppress or neutralize one another, and by introducing a configurational perspective that captures synergy, substitution, and suppression within signal portfolios.