Manufacturer Machiavellianism and distributor opportunism in China

Purpose This study investigates how manufacturer Machiavellianism influences distributor opportunism in business-to-business (B2B) marketing channels in China. It further examines how internal governance mechanisms and external environmental conditions shape this relationship. Design/methodology/approach Drawing on relational exchange theory and psychological reactance theory, this study conceptualizes manufacturer Machiavellianism as a manipulative strategic orientation that may provoke opportunistic responses from channel partners. Survey data were collected from 327 distributors in China, an important emerging market context. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the effects of manufacturer Machiavellianism on distributor opportunism and the moderating roles of relationship embeddedness, contract completeness, market uncertainty and industry competitive intensity. Findings The results show that manufacturer Machiavellianism significantly increases distributor opportunism. Relationship embeddedness mitigates this effect, highlighting the protective role of relational governance in emerging markets. In contrast, contract completeness, market uncertainty and industry competitive intensity strengthen the positive relationship between manufacturer Machiavellianism and distributor opportunism. These findings suggest that formal contracts may intensify opportunistic responses when distributors perceive manipulative intent, particularly under conditions of environmental uncertainty and competitive pressure. Originality/value This research introduces manufacturer Machiavellianism as a novel construct in channel governance research and offers new insights into how dark strategic orientations interact with governance mechanisms and environmental conditions to influence opportunistic behavior in emerging-market contexts.