EDDE-MT-Based Detection-Record Integrity and DV-QKD with Side-Channel Monitoring Using DVQMTC and E-TeLU-Bi-LSTM for Securing CPS

Discrete-Variable Quantum Key Distribution (DV-QKD) provides a mechanism for establishing secret keys between legitimate parties using quantum-state transmission and authenticated classical post-processing. In this work, the underlying quantum layer follows a biased-basis decoy-state BB84 model using phase-randomized weak coherent pulses, while additional implementation-level mechanisms are integrated to support Cyber-Physical System (CPS) communication. Exponential Double Delta Encoding-based Merkle Tree (EDDE-MT) is employed as a receiver-side detection-record integrity mechanism for detecting deletion, insertion, reordering, or modification of records relative to an authenticated committed detection-event batch. It does not establish the completeness of the original TCSPC acquisition, detect records omitted before commitment, detect physical photon loss, or increase the information-theoretic secrecy of the QKD key. Time-Correlated Single Photon Counting (TCSPC) is used for detection-event and timing acquisition, while 2’s Complement Cyclic Redundancy Check-based Low-Density Parity Check (2CCRC-LDPC) supports error reconciliation. Following privacy amplification, the legitimate parties retain matching copies of the distilled QKD key locally. Discrete Variable Quantum Mellin Transform Cryptography (DVQMTC) uses fresh, non-reused segments of this privacy-amplified key for application-layer payload protection; the Mellin-transform component is treated only as implementation-level preprocessing and not as a cryptographic key-generation mechanism. Side-channel monitoring is performed using Gini Cramer’s V Correlation-Stationary Wavelet Transform (GCVC-SWT), Helical Valley-Principal Component Analysis (HV-PCA), and an Entmax-based hyperbolic Tangent exponential Linear Unit-Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (E-TeLU-Bi-LSTM) classifier. On the AES-HD benchmark, E-TeLU-Bi-LSTM achieved 99.24% classification accuracy; this value represents benchmark-level classification performance and is not interpreted as experimental validation of physical side-channel protection in a deployed DV-QKD system. Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) and the Halton Quasi-Sequence-Invasive Weed Optimization Algorithm (HQS-IWOA) are further incorporated as classical network-resource segmentation and load-management mechanisms and do not modify the composable QKD security bound. The contribution of the work is therefore positioned as a system-level engineering integration of QKD key establishment, detection-record integrity, reconciliation, application-layer data protection, side-channel monitoring, and network-resource management for CPS. The information-theoretic secrecy claim remains restricted to the underlying finite-key decoy-state BB84 procedure under the stated security assumptions; no new QKD security theorem, formally new cryptographic primitive, or experimentally validated physical quantum communication capability is claimed.