We study the microeconomic and macroeconomic effects of longevity insurance. Using a tractable discrete-time overlapping-generations model of a closed economy we first study different types of government redistribution of accidental bequests in general equilibrium. Individuals face longevity risk, as there is a positive probability of passing away before the retirement period. We find nonpathological cases where it is better for long-run welfare to waste accidental bequests than to give them to the elderly. Next we study the introduction of a perfectly competitive life insurance market offering actuarially fair annuities. There exists a tragedy of annuitization: although full annuitization of assets is privately optimal, it is not socially beneficial, because of adverse general equilibrium repercussions.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Heijdra et al. (2013) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: