Dewey's Political Technology from an Anthropological Perspective

This article explores the possibility that John Dewey's silence about which democratic means are needed to achieve democratic ends, while confusing, makes greater sense if we appreciate the notion of political technology from an anthropological perspective.Michael Eldridge relates the exchange between John Herman Randall, Jr. and Dewey in which Dewey concedes "that I have done little or nothing in this direction [of outlining what constitutes adequate political technology, but that] does not detract from my recognition that in the concrete the invention of such a technology is the heart of the problem of intelligent action in political matters."Dewey's concession could be interpreted as an admission that he was unqualified to identify political machinery or institutions suitable for realizing his vision of democracy as a way of life.Not being able to specify adequate means to achieve lofty democratic ends is not problematic, though, if we appreciate the roots of Dewey's work (especially Human Nature and Conduct) in the anthropological writings of Immanuel Kant and Franz Boas.Experience reflects a myriad of social and cultural conditions such that specifying explicit means to structure that experience risks stymieing the organic development of political practice.When pressured to operationalize political technology, Dewey chose the appropriately open-ended and, at times, frustratingly vague means of education and growth.In short, Dewey did not want his ambitious democratic vision to outstrip the possibilities of practice, so he left the task of specifying exact political technology (or which democratic means are best suited to achieve democratic ends) unfinished.I believe that education is the fundamental method of social progress and reform.-John Dewey 1In the broadest sense, it [Dewey's experimentalism] is the experimentalism of the anthropologist, of the student of human institutions and cultures, impressed by the fundamental role of habit in men and societies and by the manner in which those habits are altered and changed.-John Herman Randall, Jr. 2 Culture 35 (1) 2019: 29-48 29 This article explores the possibility that John Dewey's silence on the matter of which democratic means are needed to achieve democratic ends, while confusing, makes greater sense if we appreciate the notion of political technology from an anthropological perspective.The late Michael Eldridge related the exchange between John Herman Randall, Jr. and Dewey in which Dewey concedes "that I have done little or nothing in this direction [of outlining what constitutes adequate political technology, but that] does not detract from my recognition that in the concrete the invention of such a technology is the heart of the problem of intelligent action in political matters." 3 Dewey's concession could be interpreted as an admission that he was unqualified to identify political machinery or institutions suitable for his vision of democracy as a way of life.Not being able to specify adequate means to achieve lofty democratic ends is not problematic though, if we appreciate the roots of Dewey's work (especially Human Nature and Conduct) in the anthropological writings of Immanuel Kant and Franz Boas.Experience reflects a myriad of social and cultural conditions such that specifying explicit means to structure that experience risks stymieing the organic development of political practice.When pressured to operationalize political technology, Dewey chose the appropriately open-ended-and, at times, frustratingly vague-means of education and growth.In short, he did not want his ambitious democratic vision to outstrip the possibilities of practice, so he left the task of specifying exact political technology (or which democratic means are best suited to achieve democratic ends) unfinished.The importance of addressing this issue arises from the fact that much of the secondary literature on Deweyan democracy misconstrues Dewey's vagueness about exact political technology as a weakness of his political philosophy, when it is-I argue-its strength. Education andThis article is organized into four sections.In the first, I summarize Eldridge's treatment of Dewey's political technology as well as some work of his critics.These critics contend that either Dewey specified the wrong democratic means to achieve democratic ends or he was too agnostic about settling on what technology was required in advance of changing cultural and political conditions.The second section imagines that political technology is limited to institutions.Dewey's silence can then be interpreted as an attempt to maintain a sufficiently flexible institutional agenda.In the third section, it is argued that the institutionalist perspective proves incomplete and, therefore, needs to be supplemented with a more robust account.To this end, I propose that Dewey's failure to specify adequate political technology makes more sense if appreciated anthropologically, reflecting the importance Eldridge affords the notion of cultural instrumentalism and that Dewey, himself, gave to the concept of culture.The article concludes with some implications of my analysis for Dewey scholarship, generally, including a call for a closer study of the late Michael Eldridge's impressive scholarly work on Dewey's political technology, and grassroots political activism.