Matching policy preferences: the linkage between voters and MEPs

The European Parliament has often been accused of its inability to link to European citizens. This article employs quantitative measures to investigate levels of congruence between individual MEPs and their voters on core policy issues following the 2009 EP elections. Operationalizing congruence as a ‘many-to-one’ relationship, it suggests that on socio-economic issues, the correspondence of policy preferences tends to be higher between voters and MEPs belonging to right-wing and liberal parties than for leftist MEPs. On socio-cultural issues, MEPs generally tend to have more liberal views than their representatives. Tobit models show that, depending on the issue, the strength of voter–MEP opinion congruence can be linked to the frequency of contacts and MEP seniority in office. Eurosceptic MEPs tend to be worse at representing their electorate, while voter–MEP agreement also tends to be affected by the electoral system and length of EU membership. The findings have implications for the legitimacy of European politics in current affairs.