What's Wrong With Contextualism?

This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject‐matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interest‐dependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are over‐stated in any case. Finally, the paper offers some considerations in favour of attributor contextualism over ‘subject‐sensitive invariantism’, both in epistemology and in moral theory. But here we note an interesting result: the very considerations that support contextualism as a semantic thesis, threaten to rob that position of its anti‐sceptical force.