The various criticisms that Mischel has made of the state‐trait approach to personality are considered and found to be lacking in substance. His major argument is that the actual inconsistency of behaviour is incompatible with the expectation of behavioural consistency that follows from the state‐trait approach. However, Mischel has misread the evidence, and pays insufficient attention to the distinction between consistency at the intervening‐variable level and consistency at the behavioural level. In addition, Mischel and others have evaluated state‐trait theories from a rather narrow perspective and thus have failed to appreciate the substantial contribution made by such theories. It is concluded that personality forms an indispensable part of experimental and applied psychology, and that Mischel's criticisms have unfortunately tended to accentuate the schism between personality and experimental psychologists.
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Eysenck et al. (1980) studied this question.