From conceptual lacuna to conceptual distortion

Epistemic injustice has received considerable attention in the philosophy of psychiatry in recent years. While testimonial injustice, and epistemic injustice more generally, have been widely discussed, hermeneutical injustice has received comparatively little attention. Furthermore, hermeneutical injustice has generally been framed in terms of conceptual lacuna, following Fricker’s (2007) approach. The aim of this paper is to expand the notion of hermeneutical injustice beyond the cases in which it results from a conceptual lacuna. I analyse instances in which hermeneutical injustice arises as a consequence of a distortion of available hermeneutical resources. In this scenario, there are available concepts that may contribute to making experiences intelligible; however, these concepts are distorted. Moreover, some of these conceptual resources, which could serve as a form of hermeneutical dissent against hermeneutical injustice, ultimately contribute to this very injustice due to their distortion. To illustrate this point, I focus on how these conceptual distortions affect those who are dealing with self-illness ambiguity, that is, the difficulty that people diagnosed with a psychiatric condition often experience in distinguishing oneself, or “who one is”, from the diagnosis. I analyse how hermeneutical injustice may arise from both the absence of and especially the distortion of the new hermeneutical tools developed by social movements such as the Neurodiversity Movement and Mad Pride.