The role of militarized interstate disputes in presidential term-limit evasions: from crisis to consolidation

Militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) have well-documented effects on public opinion and executive authority, yet their implications for domestic institutional change remain underexplored. We argue that interstate conflict reshapes leaders’ incentives in ways that facilitate presidential term-limit evasion (TLE). Early-stage disputes can generate rally effects that expand executive discretion and reduce resistance to constitutional change. As conflicts persist, public fatigue and uncertainty about leadership turnover may increase the appeal of continuity, altering both the feasibility and the mode of institutional reform. We argue that prolonged hostile MIDs make referendums, where executives can mobilize conflict-conditioned public support, more attractive than legislative or judicial channels, which become increasingly risk-averse under prolonged conflict. Using an extended dataset on executive term limits in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America from 1989 to 2023, we show that interstate conflict is most closely associated with referendum-based TLE attempts, and that prolonged hostile disputes substantially raise the likelihood of successful referendum-led evasions. These findings contribute to research on executive aggrandizement, institutional change, and the domestic consequences of international conflict by identifying a pathway through which interstate insecurity can shape constitutional politics. The article shows that conflict does not merely affect public opinion or leader survival; it can also influence how incumbents seek to revise the rules that govern political succession.