Currently, China's food quality and safety has arisen the attention from the whole society. To strengthen the government supervision is imperative. We introduce a perceived benefit parameter ϕ value function and make a reasonable improvement. And thereby we build a food safety evolutionary game simulation model based on improved prospect theory. The study shows that, because of the limited rationality of both game players, conditions C ≤ ρϖ F2, T ≤ (1 – ϖ)F2, C ≤ F1 + ρ(1 – η) F2 and T ≤ F1 + ηF2 are hardly met simultaneously in reality, which means it is difficult to achieve the stable evolutionary strategy of food safety in effect.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Han et al. (2017) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: