A Unified Definition of Biosecurity

Christopher F. Chyba rightly concludes in his Editorial that national security strategies need to incorporate the concept of biological security (“Biological security in a changed world,” 28 Sept., p. 2349). However, his focus on the public health impacts of biological weapons and infectious diseases is too narrow. The risks of “biological harm” extend to a wide range of sectors ([1][1], [2][2]). Biological security or “biosecurity” has a long history in U.S. agriculture and in this context refers to those measures designed to decrease the transmission of infectious diseases in agriculture and livestock ([3][3]). Other countries apply this concept across both the economic and environmental sectors; for example, New Zealand implemented a Biosecurity Act in 1993 and enacted subsequent legislation to manage biological threats to agriculture, horticulture, forestry, and the country's unique biota ([4][4]). More recently, the international community expanded the definition of biosecurity to address threats posed to the economy, the environment, and human health by introduced organisms ([1][1]). Thus, “biosecurity” could cover strategies to assess and manage the risks of infectious diseases, quarantined pests, invasive alien species, living modified organisms, and biological weapons. Implementing a biosecurity strategy under such a comprehensive umbrella is not untenable technically, financially, or politically. We assert that opportunities exist because many of these problems are subsets of the issue of invasive alien species. Furthermore, minimizing the risk of any foreign biological organism requires the same initial lines of defense (prevention, early detection, and rapid response) and coordination across governments and other institutions at all levels. In the wake of the events of 11 September 2001, it is likely that substantial financial and technical resources will be applied to combat bioterrorism. Leveraging limited resources and improving coordination under a comprehensive biosecurity system could streamline U.S. programs, reduce redundancy in efforts, and ensure that “homeland security” is without gaps. 1. [↵][5]1. J. A. McNeely 2. et al. Global Strategy on Invasive Alien Species (IUCN, Cambridge, UK, 2001)in collaboration with the Global Invasive Species Program. 2. [↵][6]Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity: Text and Annexes (Secretariat on the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal, 2000). 3. [↵][7]1. F. P. Horn, 2. R. G. Breeze , Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 894, 9 (1999). [OpenUrl][8][CrossRef][9][PubMed][10][Web of Science][11] 4. [↵][12]New Zealand Public Act No. 95, RS Vol. 38, p. 139 (1993). # Response {#article-title-2} In my editorial, I advocated a strategy of biological security that went beyond analogies to nuclear or chemical weapons of mass destruction. Biological security, I argued, must build on those public health steps that are also needed to meet the challenge of infectious diseases and should include domestic and international components. Although these arguments were made before the anthrax attacks within the United States, those attacks only emphasize the need for a comprehensive strategy to combat bioterrorism. The comments of Meyerson and Reaser seem consistent with mine. However, the meaning of the “comprehensive biosecurity system” that they advocate should be clarified, and to their list of biological concerns I would add the threat of agricultural terrorism. Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation hosted a conference, “Global Infectious Disease Surveillance, Biological Terrorism, and International Security,” in May 2001 to discuss appropriate responses to a number of these threats, including terrorist threats to crops and livestock ([1][13]). Readers interested in the ethical issues posed by a number of contemporary biological technologies may find introductions in ([2][14]). 1. [↵][15]See [http://www.stanford.edu/~chyba/bioterrorism\_and\_disease/][16]. 2. [↵][17]1. R. Chadwick The Concise Encyclopedia of the Ethics of New Technologies (Academic Press, New York, 2001). 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