The effect of Prime Minister Anthony Eden's illness on his decision-making during the Suez crisis

On 26 July 1956, the anniversary of King Farouk's abdication in Manshiya Square in Alexandria, the Egyptian President Abdel Nasser announced in a passionate speech the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Under the terms of the Suez Canal Base agreement, the last British troops had left Port Said on 13 June 1956, and it was the man who had negotiated that controversial agreement as Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, who was now Prime Minister and feeling under political pressure from within his Conservative Party. At the time that Nasser was telling the crowd with nationalistic fervour that ‘In the past we were kept waiting in the offices of the British High Commissioner and the British Ambassador’, Eden was hosting a dinner in 10 Downing Street for King Faisal of Iraq and his Prime Minister. Nasser was a popular nationalistic leader who cleverly tried to demonstrate, in the way he nationalized the Company, that he was not acting illegally. Free passage along the Suez Canal was, however, regarded as Britain's lifeline, and Eden, who had developed a personal animosity to Nasser, believed he should not be allowed ‘to have his thumb on our windpipe’. Egypt, however, was intent on showing that it had no intention of interfering with any nation's shipping and few nations feared this other than Israel. The threat to world shipping was an issue on which Britain never really managed to mobilize international opinion. Nor was international opinion much concerned about Egypt's growing links with the Soviet Union. Even more importantly, President Eisenhower was not prepared to link the seizure of the Canal with the danger from the Soviet Union, and he would be the single most important person in determining the outcome of the Suez Crisis. The decisions taken over the next three months ended with Eden being humiliatingly forced by his Cabinet to accept a ceasefire within 24 h of launching a military operation with the French to secure the Suez Canal. The subsequent troop withdrawal came as a result of the financial pressure from the US Secretary to the Treasury, who refused to agree any financial support for the falling pound without such a commitment. The debacle had the most profound effect on British and French foreign policy. The French moved towards challenging US hegemony, the UK to rebuilding and relying on the special relationship. In the words of The Times obituary in 1977, Eden ‘was the last Prime Minister to believe Britain was a great power and the first to confront a crisis which proved she was not’. One of the many fascinating questions of the Suez crisis is to what extent Eden's handling of the situation was influenced both by his past surgery and by the sedatives and stimulants that he was taking. In 2003, three notable additions were made to the literature on the subject of Eden's medical history, which throw new light on his condition. It was a misfortune not just for the Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, but for international diplomacy, that on 12 April 1953, what should have been a routine cholecystectomy in the London Clinic, went badly wrong. The operation was undertaken on the advice of his physician, Sir Horace Evans, because of previous episodes of jaundice, abdominal pain, and the presence of gallstones. An Australian Professor, Gabriel Kune, a specialist in hepatic biliary surgery, wrote in January 2003 that Sir Horace Evans had recommended three different surgeons to Eden, all with expertise in biliary tract surgery. However, Eden chose to be operated on by the 60-year-old Mr John Basil Hume, a general surgeon at St Bartholomew's Hospital, who in Eden's words had ‘removed my appendix was and to In 2003, an was by an John on Eden's had operated on Eden in and had had personal with who had undertaken the and on Eden in in June and in April were with the in and this is the we to what a opinion by a London to US to be of the few who the that the on the had the first operation was in the operation on Eden's was not at he left for his biliary had he was not and he was The have been on to was not of the great abdominal surgeons of the but a and he not to the in the Sir of at the London Eden's first operation as a of surgery in which the as it of the in the in the biliary to on Eden in 2003, telling a that had not been the Hume, was that the operation had to be on for an to to his what in the first he not the which was by Mr an at the operation been as more than the and Eden was within a of at of the and The by his in was that Eden's biliary was and Eden was that that was at in the London an of the of the hepatic he because was to be a of the hepatic in to the hepatic and more importantly, at in was a of the hepatic from the at the the of the was to be which to that at the time of the the hepatic was this the a from the to the of both the and the is no however, that Eden's was was an to the London and first US as Prime in Eden's from the was his and should wrong. the Horace Evans a world in this of surgery, who was by in London to that Eden should to for a and Evans who had been Eden's a Eden's operation be just as in to would badly on Britain and no on by to the extent that Evans and had to and in 10 Downing In the Cabinet about been operated on a for an had to that an appendix operation was a a operation was of a different in and On the that Eden was operated on in the Prime a Secretary, John that would over the had not to it be that he was medical was by and the Sir which had a to of the but this was with and John three the and who the of and in Street not to a about in had an a as a Eden was to he and on and in on three was It was for Eden to believe that his now allowed to as Prime which he on April to an Eden in with a in the of from to with of the the by any in the by what opinion had that Eden was of the most popular of his was by the in in Eden was to his of the by and Eden his Cabinet on was moved from being Foreign Secretary to of the and Foreign Secretary, Eden of the Foreign The of Eden's Prime 1956, with a of and a that in the on which as the Suez made to is a with the Prime Minister. a he to the of the other but the is the and went on to that were waiting in for the of a few of the in an is to support the Prime Minister in all his and without any to the as to Eden was Prime Minister we It was a but which Eden never On 1956, Eden wrote to his from but was in all was not the of a of and to the effect of on in his for July political world is of Eden's at been much and about Eden's and over the next three of it is It is to all the and to a on medical and political Eden's decisions speech on 26 to for but to military were the of the of and at this time Eden's decisions were with the more decisions he from Eden the from the in the US as as the French to the over with Cabinet and and of and on Eden not the that Britain on of Nor he the of of his and the believed that was to be it should have been in and not in the by which time Nasser had many of his and that Eden, who had never in not the a It is not Eden British troops in an in was which he went to on left a which he had in the and had had in a to In it he Eden with great about just over the and believed that the in would be more of over the the The be by a of should much of the for it is to be to the of our a is of was to that would be no about on of the Prime Minister but that the by with any that be would be On the other a should our about Israel. should to and the and not be Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of to the from the at London at the time of the Suez President Nasser of to the the Suez Canal Company, July John US of with Anthony Eden on the of 10 Downing 24 On Eden wrote to to have been on but a few important of the with on Eisenhower never from Eden his to the of on that opinion the of really not a result be by was a of Britain and the US the Britain was not concerned with the of the Suez Canal. of UK were of and the was not to a the of the Canal and that of is the of who wrote in a most of this that it was a for Britain to to the and this was a of British made by the the Eden's the Suez on a with to in the the was more than to a different no a a to in The to the of the to a of had Eden a Cabinet at and had other in the his that On he at but not On 12 were in the was by the of the Eden's from his in on he Evans on at the and the of The of allowed to the of in and a Horace Evans wrote on January to any who have to Eden he about his the Suez general the past been with and and a of have really the past his in the general was of with general and at this time he to be by in the and is no that Eden was a with is in in to be to in Britain as not many a Eden was and his concerned about his on stimulants that a feeling of and in were in and in the and In a about the of was made an and to much not on the but on the and other of the from The effect the but and not it of a is by and the effect is by with is the of the of have to in Eden by July It that were the on and in and to his in no however, of any by his to of no of any of any was to a in the in Eden a about and on other about any the of at that it is to a an more to and as the by a should about a on to and about should be and at have not to and is for a but that was no at all in such a but that should with in was by my that to on as at as was not to have to from was to that my had not as much as had been It was that we would to it had It it is now had a of abdominal which left with a It was not that would an However, with the of and have been to last Nasser the Canal in have been to the and the stimulants to the had an effect on my the first the was last the at the and it would not last that many of and by but that my past medical in a different not should be the of my of the were to in my not was as a man a and of Anthony Eden, and we were as Eden's Secretary and have been much influenced by his it to accept the that not have a at on the of his policy. agree that he have the had he been but it to believe that he would have made such in both in the political and the military physician, Sir Horace Evans, the Suez in his of January the with of which the most was that of 1956, as a of the which he with The on on a Eden was his who was an at and to with a On medical he went to in a to his and his to a for an was allowed to it been much on were of what had his Eden on but as his had been is to from the is the made by the sedatives and that he was taking. have that this have been by of the literature no for the of in the of the to that the Suez crisis was now to a On in Eden was that the Soviet a of with that it would much more to a of this by that as the British troop in and would a he not in a of military and on in the about both British and French troop On the which would have been by Eden, who came of that that Eden, however, was to in the on the last of the Conservative on 13 at The the passage he have that with is the last but be have refused to that in no would we such a On the as his he was in by Anthony that the French Prime Minister had that Eden he to over from The French had been in with Egypt's agreement with the British troop withdrawal from had made more feared Egyptian in military and political in French to were the of in the which had with the US and the On the of 13 the Prime Minister had to from the on the about the to London by Sir our in had that the French had of the to without it being with the UK and the as of the of the Eden was and the French were the to which was a British at the Eden not to have had any that the French were in with the over On Eden a in the with a of of the French and the French acting Foreign Anthony had with Eden first with the was in with the Egyptian Foreign Minister. The the first of a with which was to Eden's of the Suez It is by as a of a that his prepared to a Eden no to in to Eden, a had been it would have been for the Secretary not to it at the to the Secretary to the Foreign would have it to other and by to the Foreign Secretary in The of in the would have It was for Eden at this to for who should be in the The was that would the Suez Canal British and French with to to and Egyptian to the world as the The would Egyptian which any Prime Eden with his as Foreign Secretary, this was a and that was to be with political at and Eden not to the but that was in a The of his questions left the French in that he was on for the that Eden was he was The Eden have been on his past to have the from the he of to Eden, in his and was this and the political had been on his for of It was over few that Eden that he would have to on the of not the of his was the of with and and that Eden had been and he would have that such a the of Eden to what had and for to be to to he on the of Eden to to Foreign and the Eden that the and the Foreign would that what he to not be in international he on advice from the who was not the to the Cabinet the Prime but who that be Eden and had both from at to for a with the French Prime and his Foreign had had a with the Cabinet telling what Eden was and that we have to with the French to by his with Eden, but was now in no to to his The Foreign Secretary was not in the but that his agreement on in with the Egyptian Foreign Minister would not be by It was a of Eden had that he the as an to Nasser, and was to what the French were his Foreign Secretary to within of from without man as as any from the Foreign Eden on the Secretary, to was an of was but of many of and Eden's had in 10 Downing Even the under the of the Cabinet and different of had Eden was on his political from but were at that time he had a an was a of sedatives to and stimulants to the effect of the and had been under the of of and who would over to be was a of Eden's on the Eden's of such in a in were he and the Prime Minister ‘was not it his that be for to went on to that the were not as as at of On the the Secretary at the of Sir Eden as In Sir Eden as what a feeling about and as being a of what really in of Sir of the of in April to Secretary, John the Eden the was a and he the Cabinet and the of along with any and all by his as of a a he never been to in his in the way the to to the of Eden's under the and of Eden Eisenhower the of the that he that should be taken at to the by his Secretary, who the Eden's and decisions over and and on British military in Egypt, by the and in however, many other from at the time that the of Eden was at in the Suez to the Eden's as it developed over the is by and with by the been a to the of and a Conservative and from of is no to that Eden was but he that he really important were but over in his and he his in An to this that he was Eden his on the of the of the British in of the had been by King and Eden, who Nasser had been to for The forced a in the of on 1956, and Eden came to the the was in a his which in his Eden as of the in his were of Eden wrote in on in have is which is his power of of the was a Anthony Eden the at all this about Nasser as and and the Foreign to the Cabinet and this is it was that Eden not just to the Canal. of Eden's is in an the Foreign who to Eden on the he had the of that was as he not the to Eden the in of the and it in the was a on this it is that Eden this and to be about that such as The Times on 2003 an with John by who was a at that the crisis Eden time on to the to to and his about what to who Eden's he have made such and his that his had in from and a of but this at as is an in on in which the military and is to have had a with Eden in 10 Downing which Eden an at this is as and the never the Suez Crisis. the who was a Minister in Eden's on in that the Suez Eden as many and to and and for a of a and that this was what was and is in by Eden's as the he was is now as the medical have more of effect on and however, with Eden's that he was not and and was it in the last he have been a of about Eden being on of such as the that Eden an that he was on wrote that a who Eden he would not have in the Suez he had been in went on to that that he it was that from his in Eden was really and that his should have recommended his Eden had to on of more to to to in the of the on not as he in the of the Suez would have been in with the Egyptian Foreign which Eden and with a of at would have been a few more a Prime any new Prime Minister would have been in any to a new that by the US on Eden's Secretary in the Foreign the who the Prime Minister within 10 Downing was not at all his most important on international but would at in the his on and in on many of his of on Eden's of in by a Foreign he is not but Eden was not in a way that he not as Prime and his was in many his is at issue was his his were at the of and in 1956, as his of Foreign over the previous Eden and his of with which to his in the on it is he to he to as Foreign Secretary, Eden's foreign decisions were taken and the Suez Canal in the of the the of 1956, an and by and questions but many decisions which were not in with his past An by who wrote a on Anthony and that is to Eden believed that he would with the and it from the believe that his was not what it was at on to that the is that he was by that In the of he was and and in of a and on the of a In Eden's the Cabinet of on and on along with the and by be to the The to both questions is and for a few of Prime Minister on international by the Foreign Secretary great on a but the effect on by the of the had Eden on in that the would however, had a at the on but had no to his within the Conservative that of the Cabinet was for on military It was his of was proved that on the of he and this was because he was to with the of being about the danger to the Eden's never more than on have been by the man who have a Cabinet that had to Eden the Cabinet to in his in the of at and that with the to support in the that was no but to a It was not the from the Soviet leader the pressure on the the was and Britain had of It was a It would have been from Eden's of to have the Cabinet the Canal in the and with the French any on that over Suez it is for ‘to be about the that Eden from an to what was to being an that we never what was the of Eden was but on the that he was by more than a a of the literature that it have his and more and from to on he was under of the at French in an at Port Egypt, 10 Eden and to in the as an in a he wrote to a Conservative on it that have to it is is no but and just we had the have that by about and would have been to with as the and as the all that for many to to this and Nasser as much as Eden his in which he to the threat and with the The and of the for the military and withdrawal that he to his and Secretary, a special had from the in to Eden at his in on and that it was to have The was that never that the situation would have been had not been that the issue Nasser was really the as the issue had to be to had we moved over the would have been much but it would have been the to and many of would have been was that Nasser and the would have moved in the about April of this the troops not be kept on in he had to the at the of to the Anthony that he not about the that time we were in Port Said and had a he to was the way in which the had Mr at the was the in the and not be for his to support the had to believe that President Eisenhower not to withdrawal of the On the of the ceasefire the President had to and he was about the ceasefire and had that now that we were he that we had all we Sir Anthony had not been to the he was to the of to the ceasefire and had the President that he would he had to the President and that to The President had and Sir Anthony had the the The President that to and Sir Anthony had to The President had about that were being prepared in the to which Sir Anthony had that he not to about the he had to to that in the the President had and on the he believed that the was not for a from the British and French Prime Sir Anthony believed that he had Mr in and that Mr had the Anthony that he that he had been for not the in about the he have It would have Mr the for the time and it would have been to have in the of US the to the Suez at Port It is to be about what is to in of is not in the Cabinet were in January under the however, no be any that the Cabinet were about this on from in a was a of the this was from to Eden's was however, of the Cabinet over we from the in were no by Cabinet no taken in with Cabinet the and no Prime Minister as to to the of was a was acting in support of the US Eden was acting the advice of the US It be that no of was to the of the military but it was Eden's to to to and to all the of what was the of a of which was the at and the a and The French Prime and the Prime to and In Eden should have be no of The French and the the British to the troops the Canal and had no about the military operation It was a of Eden's that any be kept from for much than a few at the to have at the than Eden, the US about the of Eden was to the that no had taken US Eden's his and for Eden to in the of on that was not that would was to which he had never in over as an and was of a surgery, to Eden, that he was a of and an at of it is to the that as a under the of the of Prime Minister the Suez Eden's and his to in that his and should be no for Eden's in was to by with a In of decisions he the on which his great in to three with the President and to to the of the believe his was and his and to that the of the his should have to of the for a time at his and he to 10 from on and to he was to a of opinion that of not to the that should and now is to all other that to have in of over the last and it that the of world been by of and by medical not with the that should on from not is a different to extent on but it is a political Eden a about his last as Prime Minister with The on January he the next that the which The had left in my no but to to be of the of he had in of his wrote that is important that should be and more than Eden's Secretary, who in a for the first time on the made an about Eden, was his of and a and for he the of Nasser, Egypt, the of the and Anthony Eden would not have made all of