Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Set against the backdrop of internal (re)bordering and secondary movements within Fortress Europe, this editorial introduces the overarching concept of ‘nudging’ to shed light on the increasing variety of ways in which governments seek to divert or evade responsibility for undesirable migrants. We conceptualise ‘nudging’ as a distinct approach to migration governance that aims to re-route migrants or enhance their movement towards a different jurisdiction, often one that they presumably aspire to go to. We argue that nudging operates through subtle and overt (non)interventions that influence migrants’ aspirations and capabilities, making their onward movement more likely than settlement, while simultaneously preserving their freedom of choice. Drawing on the empirical evidence presented in the articles included in this special issue, we demonstrate that nudging has been employed in various contexts and at different levels of government, thereby producing, redirecting, accelerating or otherwise exploiting migrants’ mobility. Finally, the editorial elaborates on the far-reaching consequences of nudging for migrants, states and the Common European Asylum System.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Sabchev et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: