Many theorists hold that there is, among value concepts, a fundamental distinction betweenthinones andthickones. Among thin ones are concepts likegoodandright. Among concepts that have been regarded as thick arediscretion,caution,enterprise,industry,assiduity,frugality,economy,good sense,prudence,discernment,treachery,promise,brutality,courage, coward, lie, gratitude, lewd, perverted, rude, glorious, graceful, exploited, and, of course, many others. Roughly speaking, thick concepts are value concepts with significant descriptive content. I will discuss a number of problems having to do with how best to understand the notion of a thick concept. Thick concepts have been widely discussed in the metaethical literature. But some important problems concerning what thick concepts are supposed to be have not been squarely addressed even in the most systematic of these discussions. Here I want to highlight these problems.
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Matti Eklund (2011) studied this question.
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