Responsive Judicial Review in Central & Eastern Europe

knowledge to legitimate constitutional decision-making.3A commitment to scholarly dialogue also stems from this second understanding, and ethical commitment to empowering the long-overlooked voices and experiences of scholars in the Global South.At the same time, it insists that knowledge of this kind is most generative when it is not siloed but developed and articulated in dialogue with the knowledge and ideas of those in other jurisdictions.This can also be achieved in a range of ways: by individual or teams of scholars engaging in a form of overlapping or "concentric" constitutional comparison, or by scholars connecting their individual work to broader collective themes -articulated through conferences, symposia or other collective endeavours of this kind.4I am thus extremely grateful to Samo Bardutzky, Ivo Gruev, David Kosař, Kriszta Kovács, Ivana Krstić, Silvia Suteu and Gábor Attila Tóth for agreeing to join me in this form of dialogue -informed by their deep knowledge of their respective jurisdictions, but also their own important theoretical work on court structures and appointment processes, standing and jurisdictional requirements, and the design and enforcement of constitutional eternity clauses.5I also thank the Review of Central and East European Law for providing the platform for this scholarly collaboration, and furthering this dialogue by the publication of a special issue on the topic.What are the lessons of this dialogue for the global reach of responsive judicial review (rjr) as a theory?While expressing sympathy for the idea of rjr as a theory, Bardutzky, Gruev, Kosař, Krstić and Suteu all highlight the obstacles to courts adopting a responsive approach to judicial review in Eastern Europe.In many countries in the region, the process of judicial appointment provides only limited protection for judicial independence.The 3 See discussion of margin of appreciation in Rosalind Dixon, Proportionality and Comparative Constitutional Law versus Studies, 12 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 203 (2018).For this idea of dialogue, compare also Geoffrey Sigalet, Gregoire Webber & Rosalind Dixon (eds.),Constitutional Dialogue: Rights, Democracy, Institutions (2019).Suteu also mentions the distinction in her contribution to the special issue.4 Compare Rosalind Dixon, "A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison", 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 947 (2008).5 See Samo Bardutzky, 'What kind of judicial review for a small, post-communist European constitutional democracy?Thoughts on the proposal for the Slovenian Constitutional Court to adopt a responsive approach to judicial review' , (see this special issue); Gruev op.cit.note 2; David Kosař and Sarah Ouředníčková, 'Responsive Judicial Review "Light" in Central and Eastern Europe -A New Sheriff in Town?' , (see this special issue); Kriszta Kovács & Gábor Attila Tóth, "Constitutional Review as a Democratic Instrument" (see this special issue); Ivana Krstić, "Serbian Constitutional Court -(In)dependent Protector of the Rule of Law and Human Rights?" (see this special issue); Silvia Suteu, 'The Limits of rjr in the Case of the Romanian Constitutional Court' (see this special issue).