Explaining Why Presidents Count: Signaling and Information

This paper suggests why presidents, despite their reliable knowledge of Congress, utilize headcounts. It examines two general conjectures: The first emphasizes the opportunity counting provides for "signaling." Four signaling effects are hypothesized: the count mobilizes members, additional effort increases mobilization, counting increases the retention of commitments, and counting prompts crystallization of positions. The second conjecture asserts that headcounts provide vitally specific information and thus, improve upon the expectations of administrations about their current legislative situation. Two information effects are hypothesized; one suggesting that headcounts supplement administration expectations, while the other suggests head-counts provide a better prediction than administration expectations. The data do not suggest a signaling effect beyond the basic mobilization of core supporters. The data support both information hypotheses suggesting that even an administration with no prior experience can function well as a legislative leader if it invests heavily in an effective liaison organization.