Forbidden Fruit: Transgenic Papaya in Thailand

Dressed in white, hooded “personal protection suits,” Greenpeace activists donned goggles, gloves, and respiratory masks—the kind of dress you expect to see in the clean zone of a nanotechnology laboratory, not in a field in bucolic northeast Thailand. Easily bridging a barbed wire fence with a stepladder, they began pulling transgenic papaya (Carica papaya) from the trees, throwing the fruit into biohazard waste bins. The protestors stood for photographs—the press had been alerted—before a large yellow banner printed both in Thai and English that read: “Stop GMO Field Trials.” It was July 27, 2004—doomsday for agricultural biotechnology in Thailand. The protest at the Thai Department of Agriculture's (DOA) confined field trial set into motion a countrywide moratorium on all field testing of transgenic crops. Since the 1980s, the country had been a regional leader in developing a competitive biotechnology sector. What went wrong? This is not an exceptional case. Since 1998, virus-resistant papaya had been grown widely in Hawaii, but had failed to be commercialized in many other places. This is despite the fact that genetically engineered or genetically modified (GE or GM) virus-resistant papaya is close to an ideal “pro-poor” GE crop. The aim of this essay is to contrast the rapid and widespread adoption of transgenic papaya in Hawaii, where it saved an industry, with that of Thailand, where it has yet to be approved for commercialization—even though in some regions virus infection rates are as high as 100% and yields are dramatically reduced. Understanding the political and social factors that stymied this promising technology in Thailand may help in devising better strategies for introducing the next generation of biotechnology crops to other countries. “What struck me in the beginning was that here was a way that was never before possible to combat a disease.”—Carol Gonsalves, researcher. The Papaya ringspot virus (PRSV) is transmitted by aphids and is the single-most threatening factor to papaya production worldwide (Gonsalves, 1998). Following infection, PRSV compromises the photosynthetic abilities of the upper leaves of the tree, leading to diminished vigor, stunted growth, and poor fruit quality. Ultimately, the plant dies. PRSV was identified on the Hawaiian island of Oahu in the 1940s and became a significant threat to the industry in the 1950s. The industry was moved to the then virus-free island of Hawaii where it thrived in the climatically hospitable Puna region, producing 95% of Hawaiian papaya in the 1970's (D. Gonsalves et al., 2004). However, it was clear that the virus would eventually infest the island of Hawaii. Key developments in the 1980s put virologist Dennis Gonsalves in a timely position to apply relatively new biotechnology tools to solve the PRSV problem. By that time, pathogen-derived resistance (PDR) had emerged as a promising strategy for controlling plant viruses, and viral coat proteins (CPs) had proven to be effective elicitors of PDR (Abel et al., 1986). Gonsalves and his collaborators developed a mild strain of PRSV for use in cross protection but had minimal success. With the cloning of the CP gene of PRSV, the development of the gene gun (Sanford et al., 1987), and advances in tissue culture, they were able to transform papaya with the CP gene. This approach was successful in rendering ‘Sunset’ papaya resistant to the virus (Gonsalves, 1998) and a homozygous line, named ‘SunUp’ was generated. Resistant SunUp was crossed with a more transformation-resistant variety that is preferred by Hawaiian growers: the yellow-fleshed variety ‘Kapoho’. The resulting line was named ‘Rainbow’ (Gonsalves, 1998). “For me I know the virus almost shut me down. I am not going to go back and plant non-transgenic papaya anymore. It's too much of a gamble.”—Willie Julien, Hawaiian grower. The field trial of the trangenic line began in 1992 on the infested island of Oahu, and by the end of that year the researchers reported that all nontransgenic papaya trees were infected, whereas the transgenics resisted the virus (D. Gonsalves et al., 2004). As feared, PRSV hopped islands and by 1995 the industry was in crisis, with trickle-down effects that threatened the economy of Hawaii (the Big Island) as a whole. Fortunately, that year also marked the start of a large-scale in situ field trial of Rainbow (D. Gonsalves et al., 2004). The viral resistance of the transgenic plants directly demonstrated the promise of GE papaya to anxious growers, fruit packers, policy makers, regulators, and scientists. In 1996, the team began filing petitions with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to deregulate transgenic papaya and consulting with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for food safety approval (Gonsalves, 2004). In 1998, seeds were made commercially available to Hawaiian farmers. The technology became available in time to save the industry, and the Papaya Administrative Committee (PAC) obtained regulatory approval before anti-GE campaigns gained household notoriety. Intellectual property rights and the freedom to operate were negotiated by Cornell University on behalf of the PAC (Cahoon, 2003). Among those battles were disputes over PDR, the use of antibiotic resistance genes and the 35S cauliflower mosaic virus promoter, and regaining the rights to use the gene gun after the technology had been licensed to DuPont (R. Cahoon, personal communication). Once seeds were available to growers, adoption was remarkably rapid compared to other GE crops; within the first year, 98% of Puna growers had registered with the PAC to receive the seed, and 73% were growing it (C. Gonsalves et al., 2004). By the second year, 56% of the fruit-bearing acreage was transgenic. Small-scale growers (0.4–2.4 ha of papaya) adopted the technology most rapidly. Perhaps most significantly, the availability of GE papaya brought growers back into the papaya business after struggling to find other means of income during the epidemic (Gonsalves et al., 2007). Adoption was rapid for several reasons: positive communication campaigns, farmer engagement during the research and development and field trials, distribution of approximately 1,134 kg of free seeds to registered growers, and the fact that the technology addressed an immediate problem affecting farmers' livelihoods (C. Gonsalves et al., 2004). “Here people cannot afford vanity.”—Dr. M. Abdul Momin, principal scientific officer, On-Farm Research Division, Bangladesh Agricultural Research Institute, Pabna. Papaya is predominantly produced and consumed in the developing world. It is high in vitamin C and rich in pro-vitamin A carotenoids, both of which indirectly facilitate iron uptake. Thus, it helps alleviate two of the “big three” micronutrient deficiencies that plague undernourished people globally (iron, vitamin A, and iodine). A 100-g serving of ripe papaya (about one-quarter of a small Hawaiian papaya), provides 133% of the recommended daily intake of vitamin C for an adult and 33% of the recommended daily intake for vitamin A (Duxbury, 2003). Papaya is consumed in the developing world as a fresh fruit, as a raw green vegetable in salads, and as a cooked vegetable. Although produced on a commercial scale in many developing countries, papaya is also a popular crop in the backyard kitchen gardens of subsistence farmers because it is easily grown from seed, produces fruit within the first year after planting, and requires few inputs. Although a minor crop by global commodity standards, papaya holds considerable promise for diversifying the diet of the rural poor in tropical countries. Unfortunately, in most countries, papaya suffers from PRSV, limiting its productivity commercially, as well as in the backyard (Gonsalves et al., 2007). The developers of the first transgenic papaya envisaged the GE variety as a promising pro-poor product of biotechnology and were eager to collaborate with researchers from around the developing world. Suitable GE, virus-resistant varieties have now been developed for Brazil, Jamaica, Venezuela, Thailand, China, and The Philippines, among other countries. Yet, in no place outside Hawaii have growers or consumers reaped the benefits of these plants. In a recent article, Gonsalves and her colleagues (2007) highlighted how many challenges that developing countries face during adoption of GE papaya were overcome in Hawaii. The authors argue that this technology is particularly suitable for low-income farmers. With regard to consumer demand, the nutritional value of papaya—while important to Hawaiian consumers—is even more crucial in developing countries where papaya is already popular. GE papaya does not require changes in management practices or large capital investments, it does not alter production costs, and access to intellectual property is already being negotiated in several countries in a philanthropic manner (Gonsalves et al., 2007). Because the effects of PRSV have been as devastating in other countries as they were in Hawaii, there is a clear need for a solution, and a demand by increasingly vocal growers. “Papaya is being devastated and we have a solution right here. It all comes down to political will. If you want to have impact, you have to be political. That is the essence of modern life.”—Dennis Gonsalves. If papaya is such a promising transgenic crop, why is it not being grown across the tropics? Although the reasons vary to some degree from country to country, prominent themes emerge globally. There is a lack of farmer engagement in the debate, and to the extent that networking with farmers does occur, it is often dominated by anti-GE nongovernmental organization (NGO) networks and less by government or university extension agents. Many developing countries still lack biosafety laws and too often countries lack sufficient infrastructure and training to carry out the regulatory testing needed prior to commercialization. Fear of biopiracy by foreign entities is directly tied to concerns over intellectual property because most of the intellectual property has been developed and previously implemented in wealthier nations. Finally, many countries' markets are dependent on the political and consumer demands of importing countries. Some understanding of how these hurdles have obstructed the adoption of GE papaya in developing countries can be gained by examining the case in Thailand, which in many regards has become the hotbed for the controversy around GE PRSV-resistant papaya. There it has become the poster child, both literally and figuratively, for the debate over agricultural biotechnology in general. “The controversy in Thailand [over papaya] between the government and a small group of activists is making things slow down in our country and is only getting worse.”—Vilai Prasartsee, director, Khon Kaen Plant Material and Technical Service Thai Thailand is a food and a regional leader in intellectual and The country on to other developing countries, a lack of infrastructure has not been the to biotechnology crop The Plant and on the of first in biotechnology in et al., 2007). In many GE crops were developed in the country and transgenic crops were approved for in Thailand during the from 1992 to et al., 2007). Papaya is grown in all regions of Thailand at the commercial and by farmers plant papaya trees in backyard gardens or to Thailand produces less of the papaya crop, and as the et al., 2007). of all papaya grown in Thailand is consumed and the is as fruit et al., 2007). its nutritional papaya is an important food it is not for Thai people to green papaya particularly in the northeast of As in most countries, the to papaya production in Thailand is PRSV, first there in et al., 2007). In Prasartsee, a with the Thai to the virus an 2003). Although this a solution, the of to down trees that had already set fruit its Prasartsee, personal communication). In Gonsalves was at the time with cross With from the U.S. Agency for and the Thai of and they began a that for Hawaii. 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It is that the both and of the the on GE crops may never have to Thus, in the case of GE papaya in Thailand, it is important to the that this organization has in rendering the papaya a The regional Greenpeace worldwide operate of the organization in the to a of campaigns put by and to are dependent on to as of Greenpeace from to of its from to was as the of the because it and political personal communication). people in an of in U.S. personal communication). at that time Thailand was and had a relatively free in countries not the Greenpeace of campaigns, Greenpeace The development of campaigns in Thailand has a a on protection and on the anti-GE because were successful in the of the Greenpeace personal communication). the GE papaya of the of Greenpeace that of can be for Thai to in a more way was not on networking and an strategy personal communication). have to the right how and where to is during of the Khon Kaen it was It was the you the research and GMO papaya where is the food for you can be more our in there were a of that the GE papaya as well as to the are Although the of Greenpeace may a for not all anti-GE are as is a group in 1995 to rich Although in the group is to is not as as we are still within this country and we have in the have many of research on GE crops we have to with they can we to it in the or This is from The group from Greenpeace on as is an There may be some they know the or the political or in this country or the of the have to a these factors before we our Although often with Greenpeace as well as other in Thailand, its is are some which we cannot The case of they the this we cannot to our personal communication). Food The Thai press is by as and of such as is not to lack of press is in the of GE papaya and the position on biotechnology crops. The Thai of GE papaya was from to but a in by that the transgenic papaya seeds from the research This as a in of GE papaya in the second of that year, and it a for some time In Greenpeace and the were in It in as Greenpeace to the from the on field in and in prior to the In a of of GE crops in (GE Thailand (GE papaya), and the U.S. (GE and papaya), (2007) that in the Thai press demonstrated the most GE to the use of anti-GE such as as (2007) that on GE papaya were more to scientific industry and farmers in Thailand. In Thai whereas were the “The on Thai GE the new now in to the that this to Thai consumers and the to intellectual property have the In the Thai the Cornell Research which intellectual property at Cornell has by from that Cornell is Thai the CP gene from the Thai PRSV 2004). Because the was in at that university the as its intellectual CP from brought by researchers from other countries, such as Jamaica, Venezuela, and Brazil, were also by the that (R. Cahoon, personal communication). Dennis Gonsalves and Cahoon, of the problem that the PAC and other countries would not have the or political to technology on (Cahoon, 2003). In the rights to use the for Hawaii of it by entities other the for the technology to be available to other countries. the in and then to of the the to the PAC and a of understanding with the in Thailand (R. Cahoon, personal communication). The with Thailand from commercial to the small farmers the of and be able to use this technology The of commercial use is to the in Thailand but fruit that is (Cahoon, 2003). the time of the Greenpeace the was to the (R. Cahoon, personal communication). The be they from industry, or anti-GE that in Thailand the over GE papaya is the to all see papaya as a for other GE crops. Greenpeace all GE crops as a threat to the safety of the food the other of the foreign though not directly in developing the transgenic are the promise of the it may the for his “Papaya is the why the is for the papaya is because they want papaya as a leader to the for crop in this of the world. This is personal that the researchers in are a small of is even a crop cannot it the of anti-GE where is the for the next generation of biotechnology still this we still the technology to developing countries and I time is out on Gonsalves. I would argue that for the next generation of biotechnology crops can be in from the What in Thailand provides that with on how to the benefits of research from the to the farmers and consumers need it is farmer provides into the technology in is a problem that farmers and they are to the By the networking strategies that to have with growers can be This was a between the Hawaii and Thai growers, as was in Hawaii, for effective are some of the most eager of new technology they see it as a means of of they need to is much more by developing countries those as as demonstrated by the case in the (R. personal communication). with regional researchers and technology development also the of the country in factors It is that GE papaya were adopted in Thailand and production to yields would by and the for Thailand would be in U.S. et al., 2007). markets is also In the case of Thailand, of the papaya is consumed a of the as fruit to which on the industry as a whole. are as The of biosafety laws can it for anti-GE to that crops be If the country the infrastructure and to regulatory it is important to the technology those Finally, it is time to the Although are not in is better to the and benefits of GE If not this where the its If the next generation of biotechnology crops is to an on those have the most to and have yet to the benefits of the first of the developing it is time for plant to the around in some a for a the people be and the of for technology in the field as they have for developing it in the It is time to and out of the the of this research may Many people have to the understanding of GE papaya in Thailand, Dennis Gonsalves, Prasartsee, and to for his for the that to this as well as and for being an and to and for this and many The is for the Plant of this