Major powers have prized influence in Africa throughout history. This paper investigates sway over Africa’s foremost international financial institution: the African Development Bank (AfDB). We focus on the two largest nonregional shareholders, the United States and Japan. Analyzing panel data of AfDB loans from 1991 to 2021, we find that increases in Japanese bilateral aid as well as voting with Japan at the United Nations are associated with larger AfDB commitments. We do not uncover similarly convincing evidence of US influence at the AfDB. Qualitative evidence suggests that unlike the United States, Japan’s imperial past and lack of historical ties with Africa encourage a quiet yet persuasive engagement with the institution, which furthers the country’s economic and political aims on the continent. Our results advance the view that governments can pursue their self-interests through international institutions and that they may be particularly successful when they do so subtly.
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Anyiam-Osigwe et al. (2026) studied this question.
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