We noted several consequential factual errors in the afteraction report written by Bobko et al 1 compared to the official after-action report of the San Bernardino terrorist incident. 2he authors 1 state law enforcement transported two deceased victims to a hospital.Before establishment of Triage A, probation officers (PO) transported one survivor to a hospital emergency department. 2 After establishment of Triage A, law enforcement officers (LEO) transported two victims from the Casualty Collection Point (CCP) to Triage A where paramedics determined death. 2 To prevent further transport of deceased victims, the Special Weapons and Tactics' (SWAT) medic wrapped tape around their wrists.No other deceased victims were moved from the scene.The authors 1 place the CCP on the other side of the building from the conference room.Figure 2 shows Triage A, not the CCP.The CCP was directly outside the conference room adjacent to Parkcenter Dr. South. 2 This facilitated movement of victims from the conference room to the CCP, and then into law enforcement vehicles to Triage A.The authors 1 state SWAT medics did not operate in the medical branch and that duplication of medical resources occurred.After the conference room was cleared, the SWAT medic separated from the SWAT operation to provide patient care. 2 Convergent POs and patrol LEOs initiated casualty treatment in the conference room and at the CCP under the direction of the SWAT medic.We found no law enforcement medical assets were dispatched.The fire department was the primary medical first responder and handled triage, treatment, and medical transport for victims. 3The Air Rescue (AR) helicopter responded as a law enforcement asset to a crime in progress.(The county communications center must dispatch all EMS aircraft).
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Stralen et al. (1996) studied this question.
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