Governing data transactions between trust and efficiency: a comparative analysis of institutional design in the EU, the United States, and China

Formal data markets have struggled to achieve meaningful scale, while illicit data trading remains active. This contrast reveals an institutional contradiction: lawful transactions are often too costly or uncertain to proceed, whereas unlawful exchanges operate with lower transactional friction. This article argues that the problem lies not primarily in technology, but in the failure of existing institutions to overcome three recurring barriers: the allocation of compliance verification costs; the lack of predictable protection for bona fide purchasers; and the tension between personal data rights and the disclosure-based logic of commercial data transactions. The article compares three models: the European Union, the United States, and China. The main conclusion is that none of these three models has fully delivered on its institutional promise. The European Union model secures a high level of rights protection but, through overregulation, suppresses market activity; the United States model reduces search and bargaining costs but leaves an enforcement gap; and the Chinese model, while providing a comparatively centralized approval structure, has yet to bridge the gap between formal registration and substantive review. Building on this diagnosis, the article proposes a three-tool institutional framework – harmonized compliance review, institutionalized registration, and personal data accounts operating through a reformed exchange – to close the gaps. The aim of this article is to show how institutional design can reconcile stringent compliance with market efficiency, enabling lawful data transactions without suppressing the dynamism of the data economy.