Reconsidering the challenge to traditional metaethics from empirical research on folk moral objectivism

Recent empirical research on folk moral objectivism appears to bring nothing but bad news for traditional metaethics. Experimental philosophers and psychologists claim that their findings are incompatible with traditional metaethical theories and therefore provide reasons for developing non-traditional metaethical theories. In this paper, I argue that many traditional metaethical theories have the resources to show that they are not inconsistent with the findings of disagreement task studies. If this is correct, then these findings do not, by themselves, settle the choice between traditional and non-traditional metaethical theories. I then sketch how further empirical research might help distinguish between these competing theories. Finally, by distinguishing five different understandings of moral objectivity and explaining how they matter for traditional metaethics, I show that the significance of existing empirical findings depends on the relevant sense of objectivity and suggest what future research on folk moral objectivism should take into account.