Despite its potential to improve accountability, decentralization in Ghana has not curbed corruption. Using a criminological lens, this study reconceptualizes corruption not merely as a deviation from “good governance” norms but as the logical outcome of three closely connected processes: motivation, opportunity, and weak sanctions. Based on qualitative interviews and analysis of secondary data from official documents and media reports, the findings show how economic and political incentives motivate corrupt practices, institutional gaps enable discretionary abuse, and inadequate enforcement, together with political shielding, reduces the risk of consequences. These factors create a “corruption equilibrium” where key actors – including Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs), bureaucrats, and auditors – benefit from and sustain the system of rule violation. The study concludes that unless these underlying factors are addressed, decentralization alone cannot reduce corruption. This study contributes to existing scholarship by conceptualizing corruption as structurally embedded within a political context that reinforces criminogenic factors.
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Asomah et al. (2026) studied this question.