On the Practice of Ecology

Despite inspiration from their subject and an unwavering belief in its importance, ecologists often seem to be in a state of self-doubt about progress in ecology. When we observe the advances occurring in other fields, such as cellular and molecular biology, we cannot help noting that our own science does not appear to be progressing in the same way. We are debating many of the same issues today that we were decades ago. While there appears to be progress on some specific questions, we have not observed major advances in our understanding of fundamental ecological processes. Recently, an author of one of the best and most widely used general ecology textbooks told me that when he and his coauthors sat down to do the second edition of their book, they found very little that was substantively new in ecology in the years since the publication of their first edition. In contrast, a colleague who is the author of one of the best textbooks in developmental biology tells me that he has to rewrite major sections of his text for every new edition because the field is moving so fast. Frustration with the apparent lack of progress has led numerous ecologists to question the way scientific research in ecology is done (e.g. Dayton 1979; Pielou 1981; Simberloff 1981, 1983; Hall 1988; Keddy 1989; Peters 1991). The criticisms of ecology have emerged primarily from within the field, often from established and successful researchers. This essay attempts to outline a useful critique of ecological research. The motivation is not philosophical issues of epistemology, but the more practical problem of progress within our science. Many ecologists attribute the lack of progress in ecological science to the nature of the 'beasts,' not to methodological issues. It is unclear to what extent many ecological phenomena are controlled and therefore predictable. For example, current ideas that communities may not be near equilibrium, and the recent re-emphasis on the necessary role of historical explanations (e.g. Gould 1986; Ricklefs & Schluter 1993) mean that ecological systems will never be as predictable as physical or chemical processes, but many researchers think that the way ecology is done could be part of the problem. I will argue for a general critique of ecological research based on principles that are widely held among ecologists. From this critique we can make some modest proposals for improving the way ecological research is pursued. These principles include 1 the need for predictive models and testable explanatory theories; 2 an appreciation of the role of natural history vis a vis ecology; 3 the need for pluralism and diversity, and especially for new approaches, within our young scientists.