The ‘Arché’ question, as recently presented by Bengson, John, Cuneo Terence, and Shafer-Landau Russ. (2023. “The Source of Normativity.” Mind 132 (527): 706–729.) requires an explanation of fundamental normative facts in terms of non-normative grounds (NNG). In this paper we argue, first, that essentialist solutions to Arché fail to accommodate NNG because essentialist explanations require normative-relevance facts in order to be complete, and such facts are normative. Secondly, we provide a novel solution to Arché by construing fundamental normative facts as identity-facts. In turn, we consider different ways in which identity-facts can be grounded and we suggest that all plausible candidates accommodate NNG. Our argumentation culminates in suggesting that either NNG needs to be revised, or the Arché question casts the identity-view of fundamental normative facts under a positive light.
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Stamatiadis‐Bréhier et al. (2026) studied this question.
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