Between rational reconstruction and explication: Carnap’s method of translation in the Syntax

This paper re-examines the standard view of Carnap’s methodological development, according to which the period surrounding the writing of the Logical Syntax of Language is regarded as a mere transitional period between rational reconstruction and explication. I argue that Carnap, in the Syntax, employs a distinct and coherent ‘method of translation’, a specific kind of transformative analysis that differs from both rational reconstruction and explication. To clarify the differences between these methods, I distinguish three forms of metaphilosophical pluralism that transformative analyses can permit: input-pluralism, output-pluralism, and operation-pluralism. Carnap’s method of translation allows the first two but not the third – philosophers enjoy radical freedom in choosing frameworks and translations, yet must satisfy what I call the ‘translation norm’: the requirement to translate philosophical theses into formal language to remain legitimate discussants. I show how this combination of pluralism and normative constraint makes this method fully consistent with the principle of tolerance and distinguishes it from both rational reconstruction and explication. Recognizing the metaphilosophical significance of this intermediate phase reshapes our understanding of Carnap’s philosophical trajectory and raises new questions about his later turn to explication.