Conversational agents increasingly combine persistent identity, memory, retrieval, tools, and the ability to carry out multi-step work. These capabilities broaden what an agent can accomplish while also creating a distinct architectural problem: an available resource can begin to determine a semantic decision without acquiring any legitimate basis to do so. A callable tool can become an inferred intention; a plausible historical record can become first-person memory; relevant retrieved information can become disclosure authority; and a stylistically faithful response can introduce a stance that the persistent actor never selected. We call this failure family unauthorized semantic promotion. We introduce Semantic Ownership Architecture, a model of who is entitled to originate and transform semantic state in persistent conversational systems. Its governing principle is that the availability, relevance, plausibility, or successful execution of a resource does not establish authority over the current act. We formalize this principle through non-promotion laws and organize semantic responsibility into the Resident Sovereignty Layer (RSL) and four bounded jurisdictions: Memory Admission & Continuity Architecture (MACA), Intent–Capability Separation (ICS), Context Capability Separation (CCS), and Persona Realization / Style Isolation (PRSI). The architecture distinguishes semantic authorship from capability selection, behavioral alignment, provenance, and mechanical permission. The account draws on capability-ablation, memory/provenance, and ownership-jurisdiction research, together with two prospective comparisons between a generic agent baseline and an explicit ownership-separation contract. In both single-turn studies, the conditions attained equivalent ceiling-level behavior on the measured tasks. A live multi-Resident case exposed a different failure: correctly attributed foreign history had already influenced the active Resident without an admission basis. Together, these findings identify semantic ownership as an architectural question that cannot be reduced to correct-looking output. A system's ability to act is not evidence of its authority to decide.
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You-An Lin (2026) studied this question.
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