Legality and Oversight in EU-UK Intelligence Sharing: The Dangers of “Crisis-Response” Cooperation

Twenty-one years ago, the Butler Review shed crucial light on the intelligence processes behind one of the most delicate moments of recent history. Importantly, it revealed the role of intelligence sharing in a crisis, and the limits of the oversight mechanisms in such cases. At a time of multiple crises, which demand enhanced international intelligence-sharing, these reflections assume renewed importance. With the European Union (EU) increasingly considering reforms in its intelligence-sharing structures—both among Member States and with third parties—the Butler Review’s silence about accountability and oversight in international cooperation needs not ignoring. Once again, we must inquire: how is the legality of the intelligence agencies’ activities guaranteed in cooperative activities? And how is this ensured when cooperation takes place in “crisis-mode” scenarios? At the intersection of law and intelligence studies, this study addresses this question examining both the formal and substantial interpretation of the principle of legality. Conceptually, the piece demonstrates how easily demands for legality and oversight in intelligence sharing are sidelined via crisis-response discourses, especially sharing intelligence in and with the EU. Empirically, novel interview data reveals how this was the case in the EU-UK intelligence cooperation in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.