Examining the fairness objection in the free college debate

Political philosophers have grown interested in the egalitarian project of making postsecondary education affordable for everyone interested, citing civic and economic benefits. But how and why the state should intervene in this project is still a matter of great debate. Despite wider coverage in colloquial debates, broad state funding approaches like free public college have been justifiably met with skepticism among British and American philosophers. Most accounts worry that such models may be inegalitarian, serving as a middle-class benefit at the expense of low-income families. In this article, I both articulate and complicate this worry—or what I call “the fairness objection.” I argue that this objection has two common versions: (1) the weak fairness objection, or that tuition-free models are unjust because they disproportionately distribute funds to middle-income over low-income families; and (2) the strong fairness objection, or that tuition-free models are unjust if they leave any individual—especially though not exclusively if they are from a low-income family—without aid. I then examine each version of the fairness objection more closely and argue that the model at least requires further justificatory work for political philosophers and politicians before such broad funding models can be dismissed on the grounds of justice.