The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl

The central significance of intersubjectivity was already made clear by Husserl in the first volume of Ideen 1 on the occasion of an analysis of the natural attitude. The objective, spatio-temporal reality of a surrounding world (Umwelt), accepted not only by me but also by other ego-subjects (Ich-Subjekte), is taken for granted without question as an element of the general thesis (Generalthese) of the natural attitude. It is part of this general thesis that other ego-subjects are apprehended as fellow-men (Nebenmenschen) who have consciousness of the objective world as I do in spite of differences in perspectives and in degrees of clarity. It is also taken for granted that we can communicate with one another (Par. 29). How, in the frame of the natural attitude, is mutual understanding (Einverstandnis) in principle possible? The answer given by Husserl in Ideen I (Par. 53), on the occasion of the preparatory analyses of pure consciousness, refers to the experience of a Unking of consciousness and body (Leib) to form a natural, empirical unity by means of which consciousness is located in the space and time of nature, and which, in acts of “empathy,” makes possible reciprocal understanding between animate subjects belonging to one world.