Internet-Enabled Quality Supervision of Recycled Construction Products: A Four-Party Evolutionary Game

Against the dual-carbon goal and zero-waste city construction, recycling construction waste is vital for green development, and quality supervision of recycled products is key to sustainable industry development. Traditional supervision suffers from information silos, manual inefficiency, fragmented data, blind spots, and poor traceability, whereas Internet technology enables real-time information sharing and digital supervision. The government, construction enterprise alliances, media platforms, and the public form four core stakeholders whose strategic interactions determine supervision effectiveness. Unlike two- or three-party evolutionary game studies that treat media as passive channels and the public as passive receivers, this paper models media platforms and the public as independent strategic actors: media choose verified versus direct reporting, and the public chooses rational discrimination versus direct belief. These choices are endogenously coupled with government regulation and alliance quality decisions through Internet information dissemination, reputation loss, and regulatory cost mechanisms, forming a bidirectional feedback loop. A four-party evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze strategy evolution and equilibrium. The results show that Internet technology reshapes payoffs and drives the system toward high-quality equilibrium by reducing information asymmetry, strengthening reputation-based discipline, and enabling public rational discrimination. The findings provide theoretical and practical references for optimizing quality supervision and improving resource utilization of recycled products.