Most theories of action assume that people act because they want something. This article develops a concept introduced by the author, paradoxical egoism, for the case in which they act without wanting anything. In his definition, paradoxical egoism occurs "when you don't have any motivation to act but instead of doing nothing you decide to actually perform," so that "in the interest of self-preservation you do any random thing." The author specifies that self-preservation protects against "losing your sense of self," that "any random thing" means "any movement of yourself, doing, breathing, walking, speaking," and that acting restores motivation: "Absolutely, but you learn things and hope." The concept is limited to small, self-generated, non-harmful acts. I define the concept operationally and argue that the paradox dissolves when two levels are separated: there is no motivation for any particular act, but a higher-order drive to preserve the sense of self, which any self-generated movement can satisfy because self-generated action produces the sense of agency. I situate the concept in a philosophical context (the inaction trap, refusing to let outside forces decide one's fate, and pain as a source of care for others) and relate it to amotivation, default passivity, boredom, behavioral activation, effort, the sense of agency, self-continuity, embodiment, and hope theory. I derive ten predictions, including that the preference for action reflects threatened self-continuity rather than boredom and that even deliberate breathing yields part of the benefit, and sketch a laboratory experiment and an experience-sampling study.
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Cole David Withington (2026) studied this question.
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