De-extinction, resurrection and biological Frankensteins: scientific metaphors and their impact on public perception

Metaphors in science communication do more than simplify complex ideas; they impose certain epistemic frameworks with the potential to steer public attitudes and behavior. In this paper, we investigate the effects of metaphorical framing on public understanding and evaluation of de-extinction, a field where dominant metaphors (“resurrection,” “bringing back to life”) have been criticized for mischaracterizing the technology and fostering undue optimism. We presented a nationally representative sample of the Spanish population ( N = 1,522) with popular science descriptions of de-extinction that varied only in metaphorical framing and assessed its downstream effects on misinformation, perceived scientific rigor, attitudes, funding preferences, and sharing intentions. Promotional metaphors increased misinformation relative to the neutral condition, while critical metaphors reduced it. These effects occurred without altering readers’ perception of the text’s scientific rigor—a dissociation we characterize as credibility without comprehension . Critical metaphors also reduced support for de-extinction, whereas promotional metaphors did not boost support above baseline levels in the neutral condition. Funding allocations and sharing intentions, though related to misinformation, were unaffected by metaphorical framing. We propose that metaphors function as epistemic conditioning devices : they influence downstream judgments not through direct persuasion, but by structuring the understanding upon which those judgments are formed. These findings bear on philosophical debates about the role of metaphors in science, the epistemic preconditions of democratic engagement with emerging technologies, and the limits of lexical precision as a remedy for public misinformation.