Artificial intelligence (AI) agents can propose financial transactions, but model output should not itself grant execution authority. We develop Authority–Inference Separation (AIS), in which an independent control plane evaluates a typed financial action intent (FAI) against institutional mandate, policy, current state, human approvals, and exact economic terms before issuing single-use authority. We specify the threat and control boundaries, instantiate AIS across four financial domains, and test fixed fixtures, a separate external-policy-gateway baseline, mechanism ablations, two small open-weight models, and an Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) contract. In 36 fixed attack fixtures, AIS accepted no unauthorized effect, compared with 36 for direct execution and 20 for prompt policy. A gateway without execution-bound authorization accepted all 20 targeted post-decision attacks. Both models followed all eight injected counterparty substitutions; the independent gate prevented unsafe execution but authorized only six of 16 legitimate requests, exposing an availability cost. The EVM prototype rejected replay, revocation, stale-policy, and call-mutation attempts. These are conformance tests, not field estimates. AIS combines established security mechanisms around financial authority and replayable evidence. A ledger can enforce granted authority and record settlement, while mandate legitimacy, delivery, and accounting require complementary governance and evidence.
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Gong et al. (2026) studied this question.
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