Refugees, reciprocity, and repatriation

Refugees are generally held to possess a strong claim to protection while they are exposed to serious danger. Yet a difficult question arises once that danger has receded sufficiently to allow return: may host states then require repatriation, or do refugees acquire a moral right to remain? Mollie Gerver defends such a right through an argument from reciprocity after rejecting citizenship-based and plans-based accounts as inadequate. While I share much of her criticism, I argue that reciprocity alone cannot bear the requisite normative weight. Gerver’s responses to objections leave important questions about the reach of the argument unresolved, while further considerations cast doubt on both the explanatory reach of reciprocal exchange and the continuity it demands across time and place. I situate this critique within the distinctive political logic of refugee protection. Where no independent entitlement to continued residence has arisen, the question of whether refugees may remain becomes a matter of democratic choice rather than being settled by the original claim to protection.