Strategic autonomy in an era of great-power competition: Brazil’s hedging in the twenty-first century

As strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, many countries face growing pressure to align with one of the major powers. Brazil, however, has largely avoided such alignment. This article argues that Brazil’s twenty-first-century foreign policy is best understood through the lens of hedging. Rather than a coherent grand strategy, hedging is conceptualised here as a foreign policy practice through which governments pursue strategic autonomy under conditions of great-power competition. Examining Brazil’s foreign policy between 2003 and 2026 across economic, diplomatic and military domains, the article shows that hedging results from the interaction between systemic pressures associated with great-power competition and three domestic dynamics: Brazil’s diplomatic tradition, the political orientations of successive administrations and the preferences of influential actors such as business groups and the armed forces. It further demonstrates that hedging manifests unevenly across policy domains. By extending the study of hedging beyond its predominant Southeast Asian focus, the article demonstrates the role of domestic political dynamics in shaping foreign policy behaviour in the Global South.