Where can we expect support for populist parties and initiatives to be weakest, and why? We argue support will be weakest in places that have experienced strong growth of employment in high-quality jobs, because such growth has positive spillover effects that shape wider perceptions of the economic status quo and the prevailing ideological climate. We test this proposition in relation to Brexit support at the time of the 2016 EU referendum and in the present day, using Census data to proxy the rate at which highly paid jobs replaced low- and mid-paid jobs in English and Welsh Local Authority Districts 1991–2016, and substantiate it at both the area and the individual-level. High-quality employment growth is a more powerful predictor of Brexit support than alternative local economic indicators and individual-level effects are sizeable. All else being equal, analysis of Understanding Society data shows the probability of Brexit support is only 30% among respondents in places that experienced very strong high-quality employment growth, compared to 55% among those in places with negative growth. These findings have important implications for how left behind places should be defined and for strategies that seek to address political discontent.
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Katy Morris (2026) studied this question.
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