The problem is that discretionary allocation of AI agriculture funds lacks an audit trail that can withstand ministerial override, because the Shapley value of a coalition of budget claimants is not uniquely determined once the characteristic function is itself a ministerial choice. The central result is a verifiability bound: the maximum probability that an auditor can detect a discretionary deviation from the Shapley benchmark is bounded above by a function of the minister's discretion set and the audit signal's precision. The bound is derived analytically and its operating characteristics are characterised through a replication-based design evaluation using a before-after-control-impact estimator with a declared variance structure (between-cluster SD = 6.0, residual SD = 4.5, intraclass correlation = 0.64). Power was estimated across 2000 design cells. At 54 clusters the design attains 80 per cent power to detect a 5 percentage point effect, and that the minimum detectable effect at 80 per cent power declines with cluster count. Shapley attribution audits are best understood not as a mechanism for eliminating ministerial discretion but as a mechanism for making the exercise of that discretion legible, and that the verifiability bound provides a defensible standard for audit design in AI agriculture governance.
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Waberi et al. (2026) studied this question.
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