Windows of adversity: how crises entrench carbon lock-in in corporatist democracies

Do economic crises open windows of opportunity for green transformation? A prominent strand of recent literature argues they can. We show that, in corporatist democracies, the opposite can occur: Crises entrench fossil fuel dependence and deepen carbon lock-in. Extending Mildenberger’s theory of double representation, we argue that political urgency and acute economic threats consolidate the power of carbon-intensive interests, as governments rely on them for information, legitimacy, and rapid implementation. This dynamic intensifies when key political actors are weak – under minority governments, or when left parties, electorally weakened, lean on unions tied to fossil fuel industries. Under these conditions, the institutional channels that normally constrain ambitious climate policy shift from veto to appropriation: Carbon-intensive actors no longer simply block reform but capture state resources on exceptionally generous and weakly conditional terms. We probe this argument using Norway’s COVID-19 response, drawing on interviews with key stakeholders. The case traces how an initially moderate government proposal for oil-industry support was expanded into an exceptionally generous tax package. Our findings challenge the assumption of crises as ‘windows of opportunity’ for green transformation, showing instead how corporatist institutions can produce ‘windows of adversity’ – with implications for climate politics and crisis policymaking across corporatist democracies.