'The world is composed of relations, not of things' is not a new thesis — Whitehead's process philosophy already articulated it. This paper's contribution is not to restate it but to identify a structural blind spot and fill it: process philosophy remains at the level of metaphysics — inoperable and unfalsifiable — while structural cognition operationalizes the same thesis into a verifiable cognitive model, complete with an executable controlled experiment. The difference between the old and new systems: one answers 'what is the world', the other answers 'what should I do'. The paper situates the new system against Whitehead, general system theory, and structural realism, and states its falsifiability conditions.
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Xiaohei Lin (2026) studied this question.
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