A Data-Sharing Coordination Mechanism for Medical Consortia Under Government Incentives

Research on data-sharing behaviour within a medical consortium not only enriches the theoretical framework of medical data element circulation but also provides scientific decision-making support for governments, hospitals, and others, thus facilitating cross-institutional and cross-regional data sharing and value realisation. This paper focuses on the challenges of medical data sharing within a medical consortium, based on evolutionary game theory, deeply explores the strategic interaction logic between core and primary care hospitals and the government, and proposes data-sharing optimisation recommendations suitable for medical consortia. The following results were obtained: government subsidies are a key lever for initiating system evolution; the differences in the probability of data leakage brought about by regulatory intensity positively affect the willingness of two-level hospitals to share data; the level of trust between hospitals shows one-way dominance and two-way influence characteristics; the hospital-specific medical data loss coefficient imposes a rigid constraint on hospitals’ strategic choices; and the proportion of technology costs borne is sensitive to the strategies of core hospitals but stable for primary care hospitals. Finally, based on the findings of the study, corresponding recommendations are put forward, with the aim of contributing to medical data value realisation.