Demand information sharing strategies in supply chains with green services and consumer-to-manufacturer

This paper constructs a game-theoretical model to investigate demand information sharing strategies in a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a green service platform, while considering the manufacturer’s adoption of the Consumer-to-Manufacturer (C2M) strategy. The green service platform determines whether to disclose demand information. If the platform discloses information, the manufacturer may adopt the C2M strategy to adjust pricing and product decisions based on the shared demand information. We analyze three decision scenarios: no information sharing and no C2M, information sharing and no C2M, and information sharing and C2M. Different from conventional studies that focus on pricing or operational decisions alone, this work innovatively integrates platform green services, demand information asymmetry, and C2M into a unified analytical framework, revealing how C2M strategy efficiency reshapes the platform’s information sharing incentives and the supply chain’s operational outcomes. Contrary to traditional wisdom, our results show that the platform is inclined to share demand information when C2M investment efficiency is at a moderate level. Adopting the C2M strategy can incentivize the platform to share information, thereby creating a mutually beneficial outcome for both supply chain members. We further quantify the impacts of information sharing and C2M strategy choices on consumer surplus and social welfare, which depend closely on C2M investment efficiency. This study fills the research gap regarding the interactive mechanism among platform green services, demand information sharing, and the C2M strategy, and enriches the theoretical system of supply chain information management and digital business model research.