Contemporary debates on artificial intelligence increasingly raise questions not only about machine agency but also about the nature of human creativity and freedom. While much of the current discussion evaluates AI by comparing its observable behaviour with that of human beings, this article argues that the decisive question is metaphysical rather than functional. Drawing on insights into the nature of freedom from Augustine, Aquinas, and other medieval theologians, I argue that human freedom arises from the rational creature’s participation in an immaterial mode of being that grounds the free agentic self-movement. This participatory account of freedom provides a theological anthropology capable of distinguishing human creativity from increasingly sophisticated artificial systems without appealing merely to current technological limitations. After examining two recent attempts to attribute free agency to AI systems, including theories rooted in intentionality and computational sourcehood, I argue that these accounts fail to identify the metaphysical conditions required for genuinely free and creative agency. Human freedom is shown to be inseparable from the unity of the spiritual soul, whose intellect and will participate in divine wisdom and providence with a specific kind of secondary causality. Thus, I identify the distinctive feature of human agentic intelligence in its intrinsic transcendent teleology, a mark of participation in the divine. AI systems, even their most autonomous future versions, seem limited by an intrinsic immanent teleology to their algorithmic boundaries. Thus, if my distinction holds, I determine that AI systems may increasingly reproduce the external operations associated with human intelligence and free agency, but they cannot participate in the kind of creative self-movement that belongs to rational creatures created in the image of God. The article concludes that the chief challenge posed by AI is therefore not whether machines will become human, but whether technological culture will encourage humanity to reinterpret itself according to computational categories rather than its vocation to participate in divine creativity.
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Luca Colacino (2026) studied this question.
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