Research on Evolutionary Strategies for Residents’ Express Packaging Recycling Behavior Empowered by E-Commerce Platforms Under Government Subsidies

To explore the multi-party collaborative governance mechanism for the express packaging recycling industry under environmental regulation, this study investigates the interactive relationship between tiered government subsidies and e-commerce platform empowerment. Both resident participation and government subsidy intensity are endogenized as strategic variables of game players. A tripartite evolutionary game model covering the government, e-commerce platforms and residents is constructed to analyze system stability strategies and equilibrium conditions, as well as the dynamic impacts of key parameters on each stakeholder’s behavioral strategies. The results indicate that government subsidies raise resident participation and platform empowerment, yet an inherent tension exists between incentive effects and fiscal sustainability. Subsidies must cross a threshold before the system moves. E-commerce platform empowerment generates synergistic effects. Penalty mechanisms and subsidy instruments are strategically substitutable in motivating platform empowerment, which enables flexible combination across different governance phases. Parameter simulations further identify critical thresholds and evolutionary paths for the system to converge toward distinct stable states. This research provides theoretical foundations and decision-making references for improving the collaborative governance system of express packaging recycling.